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Abstract
We analyze a model of irreversible investment with two sources of uncertainty. A risk-
neutral decision maker has the choice between two mutually exclusive projects under input
price and output price uncertainty. We propose a complete study of the shape of the rational
investment region and we prove that it is never optimal to invest when the alternative invest-
ments generate the same payo independently of its size. A key feature of this bidimensional
degree of uncertainty is thus that the payo generated by each project is not a sucient
statistic to make a rational investment. In this context, our analysis provides a new motive
for waiting to invest: the benets associated with the dominance of one project over the
other. As an illustration, we apply our methodology to power generation under uncertainty.
Keywords: investment under uncertainty, technology choice, optimal stopping, real options.
1 Introduction
How does uncertainty aect technology choice by a rm or a public authority? Since the early
works on the option value by Arrow and Fisher [2] and Henry [14], it has become common
knowledge that under uncertainty, it is not optimal to invest as soon as the net present value
generated by a project is positive. Indeed the option to wait in order to gather some information
on the evolution of the uncertain state variable has to be taken into account. Therefore, the
presence of uncertainty tends to delay investment. Recently, the question of the technology
choice has been addressed and it has been proved that having the choice between several tech-
nologies to undertake an investment creates an other source of delay: indeed, the investor wants
the two technologies to generate suciently dierent expected payos in order not to invest
in the technology that turns out to be the less favorable. This is the theoretical result proved
by D ecamps et al. [6] who analyze the choice an investor faces in presence of one uncertainty
source on the output price. They nd that as well when the expected prots of each project are
too low as when they are equal (around the \indierence point"), waiting is optimal as Figure
1 illustrates. If the initial price had been lower, the investor would have invested in the low
return project, and had it been higher, he would have invested in the high return project. But
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1in this intermediate region, more information is needed to know in which direction the price
will evolve and to be sure of the decision that will be taken. Dias [7] and Dias et al. [8] nd a
similar result, but they focus on the case of the petroleum industry and use simulation methods
to motivate their results. They analyze the case where three projects are available and show
numerically that there exist two inaction regions around the two indierence points. However,
in these dierent works, if at the beginning of the analysis the output price is low (lower than
p
1 in Figure 1), investment will be triggered when the output price crosses the threshold dened
by Arrow and Fisher [2] and Henry [14], p
1 in Figure 1, and the inaction region does not play a
role.
In our article, we propose a deeper analysis of the problem as far as we consider two un-
certainty sources. Two technologies, technology N and technology G, produce the same output
whose price is random. Technology G is moreover subject to a second uncertainty source: in-
put price uncertainty. This setting applies to a public utility who has the choice between two
technologies to produce electricity sold at an uncertain price: either a nuclear power plant char-
acterized by high sunk costs or a gas power plant that is more 
exible but also subject to the
uncertain cost of gas. This is also the kind of questions that any petroleum industry faces before
it decides which eld to exploit (as suggested by Dias [7] and Dias et al. [8]). Indeed, elds may
present dierent features: gas may be necessary to extract petroleum or to carry it. In Alberta,
for instance, petroleum extraction from bituminous sand is costly also from an environmental
viewpoint. These additional costs should be taken into account.
In our setting, as in the one-dimensional case, we prove the existence of inaction regions
when the two projects generate similar net expected present value. However, contrary to the
existing literature, we prove that for some parameters' values there exists a path for the two state
variables (input and output prices) such that no investment is optimal, whereas an investment
could have been optimal in case the two technologies had been considered separately. One of the
major features of bidimensional investment problems like ours is that the investment value is
no longer a sucient statistic to undertake optimally the project. Indeed, as we show, for some
parameters' values, it may be optimal not to invest in any project even if their expected prot
tends to innity. Moreover, we also prove that it is never optimal to invest when the two projects
generate the same expected payo whatever size it has. This fact makes unexpected an explicit
computation of the optimal time to invest and that is the main reason why the bidimensional
investment models received little attention in the literature. Indeed, the introduction of input
price uncertainty in addition to the usual output price uncertainty makes the problem quite more
complex from a mathematical viewpoint. However, the presence of the two uncertainty sources
reinforces the applicability of our model. We also show that contrary to the one-dimensional
case, even if the state variables are low at the beginning, the optimal timing may be quite
dierent than in the case without choice. This issue on technology choice under uncertainty had
rst been addressed by Dixit [10] but he did the implicit assumption that the date at which the
technology is chosen does not coincide with the date at which investment is triggered. D ecamps
2et al. [6] propose a dierent analysis by assuming that as long as no investment has been
undertaken, the choice still exists: the two dates are thus the same. This is the approach we
also chose.
This work comes within the scope of the literature on investment under uncertainty that
has developed very quickly since the early works by Arrow and Fisher [2] or by Henry [14] who
show that investment under uncertainty creates what is commonly called a time value. The
existence of such an option value requires three features: i) the investment problem has to be
dynamic insofar as waiting allows to learn more on the state variables; ii) there must be some
uncertainty concerning the cash 
ow that will be generated in the future; iii) the investment
decision has to be irreversible. McDonald and Siegel [19] were the rst to give an expression to
the option value. Moreover they showed that when the underlying value of the investment project
evolves as a geometric Brownian motion, the optimal strategy is usually a trigger strategy, that
is, invest as soon as the investment value is greater than a threshold that can sometimes be
explicitly computed using standard smooth-t techniques (see Dixit and Pindyck [8]). Many
authors extended the original model in dierent directions. Dixit [9], Kandel and Pearson [16]
and Aguerrevere [1] studied how such an approach could be used by a rm to choose both
an optimal capacity and an optimal timing. Other authors rather concentrated on a strategic
viewpoint by considering not a monopolist but many rms and they tried to characterize the
competitive equilibrium. Leahy [17] showed that \the interaction of competition does not aect
the timing of irreversible investment decisions at all".
Our results are also related to the literature concerning American options on multiple assets.
Broadie and Detemple [5] and Villeneuve [24] studied the exercise regions of such American
options (they mostly focused on convex payo options) and both showed that exercise regions
may exhibit interesting shapes. In particular, in the case of an option on the maximum between
two assets, when the underlying assets are equal, it is not optimal to invest in one of them even if
the payo process tends to innity, but it is optimal to wait in order to collect information about
the evolution of the state variables. However we do not consider an option on the maximum
of two dierent assets, but on the maximum of two dierent linear combinations of assets and
this approach is new. This allows to introduce correlation in the two alternative projects. Last
Geltner et al. [12] considered an investor who has the choice to invest in a land but for two
dierent uses: if the rst use is chosen, the value of the land follows a geometric Brownian
motion, but if the second use is chosen, the value is a dierent state variable that also follows a
geometric Brownian motion. The construction cost is assumed to be xed and to be the same in
the two cases. The investor chooses the use that yields the highest payo. Geltner et al. studied
the exercise region in this bidimensional setting and found that it can be decomposed into two
symmetric disjoint regions (one for each use). When the value of each use generates the same
prot, the investor prefers to wait than to invest in one of the two.
3As already explained above, this paper focuses on a bidimensional setting. But in contrast
to Geltner et al. [12], the output process is the same for both projects and the second source of
uncertainty comes from the input price. In our setting, we prove the existence of an \inaction
region". When both projects have the same value or very similar values, it is optimal to wait
rather than to invest in one of the two. In this bidimensional setting, the investment value is
not a sucient statistic to take a decision. Indeed, we prove that the investor might decide not
to invest in any project even if each payo tends to innity. The shape of the exercise regions
is quite dierent depending on the ranking of the output 
ow of project N, N, relative to the
output 
ow of project G, G. The investment decision thus not only depends on the level of the
state variable but also on the output 
ow. It is interesting to note that if each project had been
evaluated separately, exercise regions would have been quite dierent. Indeed we prove that the
introduction of the choice modies the exercise regions of each project taken separately: it can be
optimal to delay investment whereas without this choice immediate investment would have been
optimal. We thus introduce the concept of choice value between the two alternative projects. It
is straightforward to extend these results to the case of n mutually exclusive projects.
Once the theoretical results have been presented, we turn to an application of our model
to power generation under uncertainty. We assume technology N produces electricity from a
nuclear power plant whereas technology G produces electricity from gas. Applying our results
to this example, we nd that the investment decision not only depends on the values taken by
the state variables but also on the cash-
ow generated by each technology (N or G). These
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Figure 1: Investment strategies in D ecamps et al. [6]
The next section of this paper describes the model and gives the rst properties of the
value function. In section 3, exercise regions are described for the dierent possible ranking
of the output 
ows and their dierent properties are carefully stated. Section 4 is devoted to
4the illustration of the theoretical model with power generation under uncertainty. Section 5
concludes.
2 The model
This is a model of choice between two technologies, technology N and technology G, both
producing the same output whose price is uncertain by dierent means. Technology G has a
stochastic input. Time is continuous and labeled by t  0. A single risk-neutral investor can
engage in one of these two projects. To give a rigorous formulation to our model, we start with a
probability space (
;F;P) equipped with a ltration (Ft)t0 representing the information avail-






. The output price
P = fPt;t  0g is a geometric Brownian motion with drift r   P, strictly positive convenience
yield P and volatility P:
dPt
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t be the solution of (1) starting from P
p
0 = p. The input price X = fXt;t  0g is also a














t be the solution of (2) starting from Xx
0 = x. The correlation between Pt and Xt equals
t. The instantaneous cash-
ow generated by each project equals iPt;i = N;G. We refer to
i as the output 
ow or as the price sensibility of technology i. For a sake of completeness, we
study the three dierent cases: N > G, N < G and N = G. The sunk cost of project
N, IN, is greater than the sunk cost of project G, IG. The second project is the only one to
generate a strictly positive variable cost 
GXt. The net expected prots are thus equal to
	N (p) = Np   IN for technology N and, (3)
	G (p;x) = Gp   
Gx   IG for technology G. (4)
Let T be the set of all stopping times adapted to Ft. Because the investor has the opportunity to
choose between the two projects, he shall invest in the project with the highest payo. The value
function associated to this investment problem can thus be formulated as an optimal stopping
time problem










that is dened for p  0 and x  0. The way the problem is stated implies that until no decision
has been taken, the investor is still free to choose one or the other technology. Note that the
problem involving



















5illustrates a completely dierent setting. Indeed, Vinf represents the value function a decision
maker faces when he has the choice between two technologies but the choice has to be imme-
diately done. Given the choice he is committed to, he then determines the optimal timing.
V  Vinf: in the rst case, the technology choice is only done at the date at which investment
is triggered, whereas it is immediately done in the second case. There is thus a choice value in
the rst case leading to a greater value function.




+ jV (p;x) = max(	N (p);	G (p;x))
	
: (6)
The investment region is the set where the decision maker can invest optimally. Since the func-











converges to 0 as t " +1, Theorem 10.1.9 by ksendal [20] gives that I, dened by I =
inf ft  0 j (Pt;Xt) 2 Ig, is an optimal stopping time. Analytically, this means that if (p;x) 2 I



















+j	N (p) = 	G (p;x)
	
: (8)
For a vector (p;x) of output/input values that belongs to D, the two alternative technologies
deliver the same payo and a decision maker who would be forced to immediately invest would
be indierent between the two projects. If (p;x) 2 D then the following relation holds
Np   IN = Gp   
Gx   IG;
or written in a dierent way
(
p = 1
N G (IN   IG   
Gx) if N 6= G,
x = IN IG

G if N = G.
We denote e p the ratio
IN   IG
N   G
that corresponds to the output value for which the payo
of the two projects are the same when the input price is zero. We start our analysis with a
proposition that summarizes the most intuitive properties of the value function V . To clarify
the presentation of our results, all proofs have been relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1 The following properties on the value function V hold:
1. 8(p;x) 2 R2
+;V (p;x) < +1,
2. p 7! V (p;x) is an increasing function,
3. x 7! V (p;x) is a decreasing function,
4. (p;x) 7! V (p;x) is a convex function.
6When the value of the output price increases, the investment opportunity becomes more
valuable since the promised payos are higher. Furthermore, when the input price increases,
the opportunity to invest becomes less valuable since technology G induces a higher production
cost. Concerning the convexity result 4, the decision maker is ready to accept risky bets on the
initial values for the output and input prices simultaneously.
3 Shape and properties of the investment region
We analyze in this section the properties of the investment region I. We rst try to elicit
information from the one-dimensional setting. In the standard real option framework, an increase
in the output price does not change the decision to invest when it has already crossed the
investment threshold. Indeed, if Pt lies in the investment region, then it is also true for Pt for





. It seems also reasonable to claim that investment is optimal as soon as the payo is
suciently large. We will see that these two conjectures turn out to be false.
In order to describe the investment region I, let us remind the investment thresholds corre-
sponding to the two competitive projects taken separately.1 If we only focus on an investment
in technology N, we consider




e r (NP   IN)

: (9)








where  is the positive root of the usual characteristic equation 1=22
P (   1)+(r   P) r =
0 (see Dixit and Pindyck [11]).2 Similarly, if we only focus on an investment in technology G,
we consider










In the special case where x = 0, we obtain




e r (GP   IG)

; (12)








According to Louberg e et al. [18], the investment region corresponding to the general case
(x > 0) takes the following form
e IG = f(x;p)jVG (p;x) = Gp   
Gx   IGg;
= f(x;p)jp  C1x + p
Gg:
1These results can be found in Dixit and Pindyck, chapter V [11].










N (P)   rVN (P) = 0.
7A more involved problem we can focus on is the special case of our bidimensional problem when
the input price is zero. In this case, the value function becomes




e r max(NP   IN;GP   IG)

: (14)
This problem has been deeply studied by D ecamps et al. [6]. Under the assumption that p
N < e p,
they nd that there exist two thresholds p1 and p2 such that for every p 2 [p
G;p1[, it is optimal
to invest in technology G, and that 8p 2 ]p2;+1[, it is optimal to invest in technology N. But
for p 2 ]p1;p2[, it is not optimal to invest neither in technology N nor in technology G. They
call the interval (p1;p2) the \inaction region" (see Figure 1).
Before giving further results in our setting, let us put some restrictions on the parameters'
values. From now on, we assume that
Assumption 1 p
N < e p.
Assumption 1 means that there exists an inaction region in the one-dimensional setting (see
D ecamps et al. [6] p.431). Since  > 1, then

 1 > 1. Therefore, if p





N. When the input price equals zero, another result allows to rank the
dierent thresholds.





We are now in a position to prove the existence of a similar inaction region in the bidimen-
sional setting.
Theorem 1 The indierence line D never belongs to the investment region. Analytically,
V (p;x) > Np   IN for all (p;x) 2 D.
This result extends the one-dimensional result obtained by D ecamps et al. [6]. The investor's
preference to wait in order to collect more information about the dominance of one project over
the other before investing creates an inaction region. In a two-dimension space, the interpretation
is the same. When the variables are on the indierence line, the investor prefers to wait in
order to collect more information about the dominance of one project over the other. If the
initial output price decreases, the investor may optimally content to invest in the low return
technology rather than wait with the hope to reach the set of optimal investment in the high
return technology. On the contrary, if the output price increases relative to the input price,
the investor has more chances to invest in the technology with the highest return. In fact, this
kind of result has already been obtained by Broadie and Detemple [5] or Villeneuve [24] in the
case of nancial options. They show indeed that with an American option on the maximum of
two assets, it is never optimal to exercise the option when the prices of underlying assets are
8equal. Our setting is close to this one, except that in our case, the underlying assets are more
complicated since we have linear combinations of state variables. According to this result, we
now have a more precise idea of the shape of the investment region. It can be decomposed into
two disjoint sets I = IN
S
IG. IN is the investment region in which it is optimal to invest in















We focus on the shape of the investment regions and we give some general properties.
Proposition 3 Let (p0;x0) 2 R2
+. The following properties hold
1. If (p0;x0) 2 IG, then 8x  x0;(p0;x) 2 IG,
2. If (p0;x0) 2 IN, then 8x  x0;(p0;x) 2 IN,
3. If N  G and if (p0;x0) 2 IN, then 8p  p0;(p;x0) 2 IN,
4. If G  N and if (p0;x0) 2 IG, then 8p  p0;(p;x0) 2 IG.
Result 1 states that if it is optimal to invest in technology G, it will remain so if the input
price decreases. Indeed, its expected prot increases whereas the expected prot generated by
technology N remains constant. On the contrary, when investment in technology N is optimal,
it remains so if the input price increases (Result 2). Such an increase indeed has no eect on
the expected payo generated by technology N and at the same time it makes technology G
less competitive. In the case where the price sensibility of technology N is higher than the one
of technology G, if it is already optimal to invest in technology N for a given level of output
price, it is all the more optimal to invest in technology N with a higher output price and hence
a higher prot (Result 3). Result 4 tells the same story in the case where the price sensibility
of technology N is lower than the one of technology G.
This proposition gives a rst idea of the shape of the investment regions. But a more precise
study requires a separation of the dierent cases depending on the ranking of the output 
ows.
Before going further, we present the graphs of the two investment regions in the three cases
N > G, G > N and N = G.
We begin with a careful examination of the case N > G. As the remaining two cases will
exhibit similar properties, developments will be shorter.
3.1 The output 
ow of technology N is higher than the output 
ow of tech-
nology G: N > G
In this paragraph, we describe the exercise region that corresponds to the investor's problem
when the output 
ow generated by technology N is greater than that generated by technology
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Figure 2: Shape of the investment regions when N > G
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Figure 3: Shape of the investment regions when N < G























Figure 4: Shape of the investment regions when N = G
G. First, we study the investment region for which it is optimal to invest in technology N, IN.
Let us dene
P
1;N (x) = inf fp 2 R+j(x;p) 2 INg; (17)
which is the minimal level of output price for which it is optimal to invest in technology N given
that the input price equals x. Next proposition gives the main features of this function P
1;N.
Proposition 4 (MacDonald and Siegel [19] or Dixit and Pindyck [11])
Function P
1;N exhibits the following properties:
1. x 7! P
1;N (x) is a decreasing function,
2. x 7! P
1;N (x) is a convex function,
3. P




1;N (x) = p
N.
Proposition 4 describes the shape of the investment region IN. Result 1 states that when the
input price increases, the threshold value of the output price for which it is optimal to invest in
technology N decreases. Indeed, when the input price increases, the expected payo generated
by technology G decreases whereas the expected payo generated by technology N remains
constant. Knowing that technology G becomes less protable, the investor chooses a threshold
value of the output price for which it is optimal to invest in technology N that is decreasing
with the input price. This eect decreases as the input price increases (Result 2): in this case,
technology G is less competitive and plays almost no role in the decision any more. Ultimately,
when the input price tends to innity, project G totally disappears, coming back to the basic
11setting where there is only one project. It is thus optimal to invest as soon as the output price
is greater than the usual threshold p
N (Result 4).
Concerning investment region IG, we have to prove rst that it is nonempty under Assump-
tion 1.
Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1, IG is nonempty.
We dene function
p 7! X
1;G (p) = supfx 2 R+jV (x;p) = Gp   
Gx   IGg (18)
which has to be viewed as the maximal level of input price for which it is optimal to invest in
technology G given that the output price equals p. Its main features are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 Function X
1;G exhibits the following properties:
1. p 7! X




Concavity of function X
1;G implies the existence of a maximum level of input cost above
which it is never optimal to invest in technology G. As soon as the input cost increases, the
set of output prices for which it is optimal to invest in technology G becomes smaller and tends
to disappear. Moreover, the shape of the investment region gives some counterintuitive results.
Let us imagine that the input/output prices are such that they are \just above" IG so that it is
not optimal to invest immediately. If the output price decreases and the input price increases in
such a way that they fall into IG, it becomes optimal to invest in technology G though both the
output and the input prices decreased. In this case, the investor is indeed sure that it will be too
long and thus costly to reach IN. He thus accepts to invest in the project with the lowest price
sensibility. When we consider the two projects simultaneously, the investment regions are quite
dierent from the case where each project is taken separately. The presence of the two projects
makes the investor more reluctant to invest in one of the two projects when the projects' prots
are close and even if they are very high. He prefers to wait to obtain more information about
the dominance of one project over the other: a choice value is created. Note that contrary to
D ecamps et al. [6], if at the beginning, the two state variables present low values, investment
may be triggered later than if no choice had been available.
Let us look at two extreme cases. If the two state variables Pt and Xt tend to 0 when t tends
to +1 (what happens when r < min(P;X)), there exist paths such that if, at the beginning,
the state variables do not belong to any exercise region, no investment will never be undertaken
before both state variables reach the point (0;0). If only one technology had been available,
an investment may have been optimally triggered. Conversely, if the two state variables tend
12to +1 when t tends to +1 (what happens when r > max(P;X)), an investment will be
triggered for sure. Let us now turn to the case where the output 
ow from technology G is
greater than the one of technology N.
3.2 The output 
ow of technology G is higher than the output 
ow of tech-
nology N: G > N
In order to study the shape of the investment regions, we dene P
2;G (x) = inf fp 2 R+j(x;p) 2 IGg.
To be more explicit, we have
P
2;G (x) = inf fp 2 R+jV (x;p) = Gp   
Gx   IGg: (19)
P
2;G has to be viewed as the minimal level of output price for which it is optimal to invest in
technology G given that the input price equals x. We rst focus on investment region IG and
on the general properties of function P
2;G.
Proposition 7 Function P
2;G exhibits the following properties:
1. x 7! P
2;G (x) is an increasing function,
2. x 7! P
2;G (x) is a convex function,
3. P
2;G (0) = p
G.
These results are very similar to the ones obtained in Proposition 4 when N > G. As
the input price increases, the threshold value of the output for which it is optimal to invest
in technology G increases. Indeed, for a given output price, when the input price increases,
the expected payo generated by technology G decreases. Therefore, in order technology G to
remain the optimal choice, the optimal threshold has to increase (Result 1). Convexity of the
optimal threshold (Result 2) shows that the choice value created by the competition between the
two projects is all the more important as the input price increases. When the input price is equal
to zero, technology G dominates technology N since it has a higher payo and a lower cost. It
is indeed as if technology N did not exist any more and it is optimal to invest in technology G
as soon as the output price exceeds the usual threshold p
G (Result 3). Next proposition states
precisely the behavior of function P
2;G for large input price and conrms that the choice value
increases with the input price. In order to prepare the statement of the proposition, we need to
recall some results concerning the price of an exchange option.










It is well known (see for instance Brodie and Detemple [5]) that the exercise region (the set
where Ce(p;x) = p   x) of the exchange option is given by the set
f(p;x) 2 (0;1)2 ; p  xg
where  is a real number larger than one.
13Proposition 8 Function P






















The limit of P
2;G is dicult to obtain. However, its asymptotic behavior can be determined.
We observe in particular that as the input price x increases, P
2;G moves away the indierence
line D. Therefore, there is an open cone on the left side of the indierence line (likely with a
very small aperture) where it is never optimal to exercise. As a consequence, for any xed time
horizon T, there is a path with positive probability that remains inside the cone up to time T.
Thus, it is optimal not to invest in any project even if their expected prot tends to innity.
This feature depends crucially on the bidimensional setting. The choice value is thus unbounded
for large values of both input and output prices. Now, we focus on the other investment region
IN and on function
p 7! X
2;N (p) = inf fx 2 R+jV (p;x) = Np   INg; (20)
which is the minimal level of input price for which it is optimal to invest in technology N.
Proposition 9 Function X
2;N exhibits the following properties:
1. p 7! X





2;N (p) = +1.
The ndings concerning the investment regions are symmetric with the case N > G. Along
the indierence line and despite the fact that the prot is unbounded, it is not optimal to invest
in any project due to the choice value generated by the competition between the two projects.
Moreover, there is a minimum level of input price that makes investment in technology N
optimal. For a given input price that is very low, investment can only occur in technology G.
On the contrary, for a given input price that is high enough, investment can occur in the two
technologies depending on the level of the output price. As in the previous case, when Pt and
Xt tend to (0;0) (that is if r < min(P;X)), there exist paths such that no investment will be
triggered even if the state variables are high at the beginning, under the condition that they do
not belong to any investment region. If only one technology had been available, an investment
might have been optimal. We study the last case where the two technologies generate exactly
the same output 
ow.
143.3 The output 
ow of both technologies are equal: N = G
In this section, the two technologies present the same price sensibility. The indierence line is
then equal to x = IN IG

G . It is interesting to note that the three dierent cases are described by
a rotation of the indierence line. Here, we are in the extreme case where the indierence line
is vertical. As in the rst two cases, we dene
P
3;G (x) = inf fp 2 R+jV (p;x) = Gp   
Gx   IGg and (21)
P
3;N (x) = inf fp 2 R+jV (p;x) = Np   INg: (22)
Proposition 10 The following properties concerning functions P
3;G and P
3;N hold:
1. x 7! P
3;G (x) is an increasing and convex function,
2. x 7! P
3;N (x) is a decreasing and convex function,
3. P














3;N (x) = +1 and lim
x!+1
P
3;N (x) = p
N.
When the input price is zero, this is as if technology G were unique and investment in
technology G is thus optimal as soon as the output price is greater than the usual threshold
p
G. On the contrary, when the input price tends to +1, this is as if there were only technology
N and investment is optimal as soon as the output price is greater than p
N. Here the two
investment regions are clearly separated by a vertical line that corresponds to the indierence
line. When the input price is lower than IN IG

G , any potential investment would only occur
in technology G, whereas when the input price is greater than IN IG

G , it would only occur in
technology N. That P
3;G is increasing and P
3;N is decreasing illustrates the interaction between
the two technologies. This eect is at its height when the input price exactly equals IN IG

G ,
since the investor will never invest in any of the two projects even if the common prot tends to
innity. Indeed, his indierence makes him wait to choose the most favorable technology. With
this extreme case, we see that the level of the future cash-
ow is not a sucient statistic to take
any decision in this bidimensional setting.
Here also, when Pt and Xt tend to (0;0) (r < min(P;X)), there exist paths such that no
investment is undertaken, whereas an investment may have been triggered if the two technologies
had been separately available. When Pt and Xt tend to (+1;+1) (r > max(P;X)), an
investment will be triggered in one or the other technology. We now have a precise idea of the
shape of the investment regions for dierent values taken by the pair input/output prices and
by N and G. We can go to the next section that proposes an application of this model to
power generation under uncertainty.
154 Application: power generation under uncertainty
The multiple technologies to produce electricity makes any investment decision dicult. For
instance, what should an investor choose between a technology with high sunk costs and a high
price sensibility and a technology that is more 
exible but that presents a lower price sensibility
at the same time? Moreover, how to take into account the characteristics of the electricity
market? This is the kind of questions we are trying to answer in this section. We consider two
ways to produce electricity:
- technology N produces electricity with a nuclear power plant,
- technology G produces electricity with a gas power plant.
In this particular case, P can be considered as the electricity price, whereas X can be viewed
as the cost of supplying gas. Bckman et al. [4] review the dierent models for electricity price.
They recall that Schwartz and Smith [23] and Pindyck [22] prove that long term electricity
price can be modelled as a geometric Brownian motion, this approximation leading to only
small errors. Gollier et al. [13] also model electricity price as a geometric Brownian motion.
Concerning gas price, Pindyck [21] explains that \for purposes of making investment decisions,
one could just as well treat the price of oil as a geometric Brownian motion". Each technology
presents the following features.
-Technology N. TN years are needed to build the production unit. This means that once
the investment decision has been taken, the investor does not get any prot immediately:
there is a lag between the time at which investment is decided and the time at which
power generation starts. We assume moreover that the production unit lasts LN years,
implying that, following an investment at date t, the prot 
ow only exists on the time
period [t + TN;t + TN + LN]. Sunk capital cost is denoted IN. The prot is thus given by
the following function:
	N (p) = e rTNE
Z TN+LN
TN
P (t)e rtdtjP (0) = p

  IN:
According to the dynamic of Pt, for t  TN,
Pt = PTN exp








































We nally have that
	N (p) = Np   IN (23)
16with N = 1
P e (r+P)TN  
1   e PLN
. We recover the expression of the initial model with
the output 
ow N. N that can also be seen as the price sensibility of the technology is
an increasing function of LN, and a decreasing function of TN. The more important is the
time lag between the decision and the eective electricity generation, the less prot the
investor gets.
-Technology G. TG years are needed to build the production unit that lasts LG years. Sunk
capital cost is denoted IG. The amount of gas required to generate one electricity unit is
equal to lG. The prot is given by the following function:
	G (p;x) = e rTGE
Z TG+LG
TG





lGX (t)e rtdtjX (0) = x

  IG:
By making similar computations than in the case of the nuclear technology, we easily
obtain that
	G (p;x) = Gp   
Gx   IG; (24)








As for technology N, G is increasing in LG and decreasing in TG. But the eect on the
prot function is not clear, because the variable cost has to be taken into account and

G is increasing in LG and decreasing in TG. Therefore, the total eect of LG and TG on
	G (p;x) is not determined.
We make the following assumptions on the parameters' values:
- IN > IG,
- lG > 0 and so 
G > 0.
Thanks to these assumptions and depending on the values taken by Ti and Li, for i = N;G, the
three cases concerning the ranking of the price sensibility i may arise. We suppose that the
length of life of a nuclear power plant is twice longer than that of a thermal power plant and
























;then G > N;








;then N = G:
With the assumption on the length of life, the output 
ow generated by the nuclear power plant
is greater than the one generated by the thermal power plant if the construction time of a nuclear
power plant is not too long relative to the thermal power plant. We recover the characteristics
17of the investment regions obtained in the previous part. In the case where the output 
ow of
the nuclear power plant is greater than the one of the gas power plant, it can be optimal to
invest in a gas power plant after a fall in the electricity price and an increase in the gas price.
Indeed, the investor prefers to be sure he does not lose an opportunity to invest in the nuclear
power plant, therefore he waits until it becomes too costly to invest in the nuclear technology.
When the price sensibility of the gas power plant is higher than the one of the nuclear power
plant, the optimal choice goes from the gas power plant to the nuclear technology as the cost of
supplying gas increases. If gas is not too costly, it is preferred because the technology is more

exible than a nuclear power plant. Another surprising result occurs when N = G. Indeed,
when x = IN IG

G , we are on the indierence line and even if the output price tends to innity,
the investor is indierent between the two projects. Although it is possible for him to obtain
an innite prot, he prefers to wait to know in which direction the state variables are going to
evolve and which technology to select. We recover the fact that the prot level is not a decision
variable any more. These extreme results should of course be understood with care notably with
respect to the assumptions: no competition, no terminal date... The presence of the terminal
date for instance would trigger an investment even in the inaction region. Bobtche [3] analyzes
the role of competition in such a model of technology choice with one uncertainty source and
shows that under competition, the inaction regions may disappear. However assuming that
the construction times of the two plants are not too dierent, N will be greater than G and
investment in the nuclear technology is more likely to be optimal.
However we think that our analysis allows to have some insights on the investment policy
in the energy sector, where some choices are done by the public authority and the eect of
competition is thus alleviated. Indeed, according to the International Energy Agency, \electricity
capacity reserve margins are declining in most OECD countries signalling the need for new
investment. The supply disruptions in parts of North America and Europe in summer 2006
have raised again questions about the adequacy of generation margins and investment in network
infrastructure".3 Here our interpretation of this fact is that the simultaneous presence of dierent
technologies (coal, gas and nuclear plant, renewable resources) in the electricity sector creates a
source of delay in such an investment decision. Note also that the results are highly dependent
on the characteristics of each power plant. In this application, depending on the values given
to the construction lag and to the lifetime of the production unit, we may obtain very dierent
results as far as the ranking of N with respect to G may change.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper studies the choice by an investor between two mutually exclusive projects under both
output price and input price uncertainty. In this bidimensional setting, the main diculty is to
determine the set of values for which it is optimal to invest. Our main nding is that it is never
3See World Energy Outlook 2006 [15].
18optimal to invest when the competitive projects yield the same prot, that is when the investor
is indierent between the two. The interpretation is that the investor prefers to wait in order to
collect information rather than to invest too fast in a project that turns out to be unprotable.
The study of the dierent possible investment regions shows us that they are quite dierent
depending on the values taken by the price sensibilities. When G  N, for low values of the
input price, optimal investment may only occur in technology G, and for high values of the input
price, optimal investment occurs more likely in technology N. When N > G, for high values
of the input price, optimal investment can only occur in technology N, and for low values of
the input price, optimal investment may occur in both technology. The shape of the exercise
regions is very dierent than if each project were taken separately: the interaction between the
two projects creates what we shall call a choice value. It has to be added to the time value that
corresponds to the optimal moment to invest and that has been demonstrated by McDonald
and Siegel [19] or by Henry [14]. A natural extension could be to consider such a technology
choice in a competitive setting. Do rms still take the time to ensure their investment decision?
The fear of being preempted will certainly decrease the choice value but to which extent? Are
rms going to dierentiate one from the other by doing asymmetric investment? Some of these
questions have been analyzed by the rst author under one uncertainty source (see Bobtche
[3]).
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21A Proof of Proposition 1



























































This implies that V (p;x)  VN (p) + VG (p;0). Because P > 0 and X > 0, VN (p) and VG (p;0) are
explicit functions (see MacDonald and Siegel [19] or Dixit and Pindyck [11]) that are nite. The value
function V is thus nite.
Results 2 and 3 immediately follow from a composition of monotonic functions.
Concerning Result 4, we have to show that
V (p0 + (1   )p1;x0 + (1   )x1)  V (p0;x0) + (1   )V (p1;x1);
for any (p0;x0), (p1;x1) and  2 [0;1].
By denition, putting p() = p0 + (1   )p1 and x() = x0 + (1   )x1 we have
































 + (1   )Pp1
 )   IN;G (Pp0
 + (1   )Pp1
 )   
G (Xx0
 + (1   )Xx1



















Because this inequality is true for every stopping times , it follows that
V (p0 + (1   )p1;x0 + (1   )x1)  V (p0;x0) + (1   )V (p1;x1);
what concludes the proof. 2
B Proof of Proposition 2
Let us introduce the value function




e r ((N   G)P   (IN   IG))+

:
Using that max(x;y) = (x   y)+ + y, we have
E









e rt (GP   IG)

:
Taking the supremum over the stopping times  gives the inequality V (p)  C (p) + VG (p). According
to MacDonald and Siegel [19] or Dixit and Pindyck [11], the optimal threshold above which the value









Therefore, for any p 





22C Proof of Theorem 1
For every t  0, we have by denition of the value function











































































































































where the last equality comes from the fact that (p;x) belongs to the indierence line and where the
function f(:) is dened as
f (t;y1;y2) = max(Npe (P+
2
P
2 )t+Py1   IN;Gpe (P+
2
P














Np   IN + NpPy1;Gp   














j  ct where c is a constant. Using
that max(a;b)   max(c;d)  max(a   c;b   d), we have:





2 )t+Py1   Np(1 + Py1);Gpe (P+
2
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2 )t+Py1   Np(1 + Py1)j + jGpe (P+
2
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2 )t+Py1   Np
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j  (c1 + c2 + c3)t = ct. It
follows that























tg2), where the gi are Gaussian random
variables, we have
V (x;p)  Np   IN +
p
tE[max(h1;h2)] + o(t); (A.1)




GxXg2 are also Gaussian random
variables. According to the standard property:
If Eg = Eh = 0 and P(h 6= g) > 0, then Emax(g;h) > 0,
we have that V (x;p) > Np   IN which concludes the proof.
D Proof of Proposition 3
Case 1: 8x  x0,



















e r (max(	N (P);	G (Xx















G (x0   x):
Because V (p0;x0)  Gp0  
Gx0  IG, we get V (p0;x)  Gp0  
Gx IG, and thus (p0;x) belongs to
the investment region.
Case 2: 8x  x0, V (p0;x)  V (p0;x0). So, we have V (p0;x)  Np0   IN.
It follows that V (p0;x) = Np0   IN, which ends the proof.
Case 3: In this case, N  G and we take p  p0:



















As N  G, it follows that V (p0;x)   V (p0;x0)  (p   p0)N. Because we assume V (p0;x0) =
Np0   IN, we have: V (p;x0)  Np   IN and the result follows.
Case 4: As p  p0, we have the same inequality than above:



















But, now, G  N and consequently, V (p0;x)   V (p0;x0)  (p   p0)G. An analogous argument as
above with V (p0;x0) = Gp0   
G   IG leads to the result. 2
E Proof of Proposition 4












2 IN. By denition of P
1;N,
P
1;N (x1)  P
1;N (x0). It follows that P
1;N (:) is a decreasing function.
Result 2: In order to show that P
1;N is a convex function, we are going to proceed in several steps. The
rst step consists in proving that IN is a convex set. We want to show that if (x0;p0) and (x1;p1) 2 (IN)
2,
then (x0 + (1   )x1;p0 + (1   )p1) 2 IN.
V (p0 + (1   )p1;x0 + (1   )x1)  V (p0;x0) + (1   )V (p1;x1);
= (Np0   IN) + (1   )(Np1   IN);
= N (p0 + (1   )p1)   IN:
24But, knowing that
V (p0 + (1   )p1;x0 + (1   )x1)  maxfN (p0 + (1   )p1)   IN;
G (p0 + (1   )p1)   
G (x0 + (1   )x1)   IGg:
This implies that
V (x0 + (1   )x1;p0 + (1   )p1) = N (p0 + (1   )p1)   IN
and thus
(x0 + (1   )x1;p0 + (1   )p1) 2 IN:
The second step consists in showing that P
1;N is eectively a convex function. As IN is a convex set,
 
x0 + (1   )x1;P




By denition, we have the following inequality:
P
1;N (x0 + (1   )x1)  P
1;N (x0) + (1   )P
1;N (x1);
and it follows that P
1;N is a convex function.
Note that we have also proven that (p;x) 7! V (p;x) is a convex function.
Result 3: This result has been shown by D ecamps, Mariotti and Villeneuve [6].
Result 4: Once again, we are going to demonstrate this result using several steps.
Note that VN (p)  V (p;x). Let us dene the set N =

(x;p) 2 R2




take (p;x) 2 N with p < p
N. We have the following inequalities:
V (p;x)  VN (p);
> Np   IN:
It follows that (p;x) does not belong to IN. Moreover, we have lim
x!+1
V (p
N;x)  VN (p
N).
The next step consists in proving that lim
x!+1
V (p
N;x) = V1 (p
N).
We take (xn)n0 that tends to +1. If n is high enough, (p
N;xn) 2 N.
0  V (p











































. It follows that:
0  V (p











































It follows that lim
n!+1
V (p
N;xn) = VN (p














N   IN: (A.2)





















































25Since rIN   Pp
























1;N(x) = l > p
N and let " be such that " < l   p
N. Let us dene M = IN IG

G
and the stopping times n
M = inf ft  0jX
xn










We have n  n
M ^  and lim
n!+1n
M ^  = , what leads to a contradiction
All these steps allow us to conclude that lim
x!+1
P
1;N (x) = p
N. 2
F Proof of Proposition 5
We will make a proof by contradiction assuming that IG is empty. As a consequence, optimal stopping
theory (see Theorems 10.1.9 and 10.1.12 in ksendal [20]) gives











Therefore, we have V (p;x) = VN(p). But, for x <
N G














which yields to a contradiction. 2
G Proof of Proposition 6
Concerning Result 1, we are going to use the same steps as the ones used to prove the convexity of the
function P
1;N. IG is a convex set which implies that
 
X
1;G (p0) + (1   )X
1;G (p1);p0 + (1   )p1

2 IG:
But, we also have that  
X
1;G (p0 + (1   )p1);p0 + (1   )p1

2 IG:
Therefore by denition of X
1;G,
X
1;G (p0 + (1   )p1)  X
1;G (p0) + (1   )X
1;G (p1):
Concerning Result 2, recall that function VG dened in the previous section is such that VG (p;x) 
V (p;x). It follows that X







By letting p tend to p
G, we conclude that X
1;G (p
G) = 0. 2
26H Proof of Proposition 8
Let us explicit the exchange option price by:



























max(Np   IN;Gp   
Gx   IG) = max(Np   IN + IG;Gp   
Gx)   IG;
= max( (IN   IG);(G   N)p   
Gx)   IG + Np;
 max(0;(G   N)p   
Gx)   IG + Np;
we obtain
V (x;p)  Ce ((G   N)p;
Gx) + C (N;p;IG);
where C (N;p;IN) is the price of a call option dened by



















V (p;x)  (G   N)p   
Gx   IG + Np;
= Gp   
Gx   IG:













G N x for x high enough. And for













To prove the other part of the proposition, we set ^ p = IN IG
G N . We then customize the indierence line
by the pair (^ p +

G
G N x;x). For every h > 0, we have using equation (A.1)













x)   IN +
p
tE(max(h1;h2)) + o(t);




GxXg2. Because g1 and g2 are two

























We choose t small enough to have o(1) >  1
2
G N




















Thus, the pair (^ p + (1 + h)

G
G N x;x) does not belong to the investment region and because h does not












27I Proof of Proposition 10




Concerning Result 3, as x 7! P
3;G (x) is an increasing and convex function, and as the indierence






3;G (x) = +1.
A similar arguments holds for Result 4, and the limit when x ! +1 comes from the limit of
x 7! P
1;N (x). 2
28